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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

)
)
)
)

NO. 47431-2019
BONNEVILLE COUNTY NO. CRl0-18-10632

)

)
LEROY MILTON COTTERELL, )
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Leroy Cotterell contends the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence, in particular by refusing to retain jurisdiction over his case.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
As officers were opening the investigation in this case, Mr. Cotterell called authorities to
confess that he had inappropriately touched his niece. (See R., p.19.) He ultimately pied guilty
to one count of Lewd Conduct, and the state dismissed other charges. (R., pp.84-85.) There was
no agreement as to the sentencing recommendations as part of that plea agreement, though
Mr. Cotterell did agree to pay "full restitution." (R., p.85; see generally R., pp.84-87.)
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The presentence investigation (PSI) revealed that, at

this was Mr. Cotterell's first

felony conviction. (Con£ Exh., pp.I, 11.) However, the PSI author also noted he had struggled
while previously on misdemeanor probation.

(Con£ Exh., p.18.)

In the PSI interview,

Mr. Cotterell explained that he had been high on methamphetamine at the time of the offense,
and that the pretrial incarceration represented the longest period of sobriety he has had. (Con£
Exh., pp.4, 15; see also Tr., p.21, Ls.19-25 (trial counsel noting that Mr. Cotterell has not had
significant substance abuse treatment before).) The psychosexual evaluation (PSE) concluded
that Mr. Cotterell lacked insight into his criminal conduct, noting less-than-truthful responses in
the accompanying polygraph examination. (Conf. Exh., pp.23, 31.) Nevertheless, it concluded
he only presented an average risk to reoffend. 1 (Con£ Exh., p.39.) The evaluator concluded
Mr. Cotterell would need treatment for both his sex offense issues and his substance abuse
issues, but that, if he were properly motivated and the treatment program properly structured,
that rehabilitation could occur in the community. (Conf. Exh., pp.46-47.)
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel recommended the district court impose a
sentence often years, with two years fixed, and retain jurisdiction. (Tr., p.17, Ls.5-8.) He noted
that Mr. Cotterell had been prescribed some medications for mental health issues while
incarcerated, and that those medications, along with his extended sobriety, were starting to help.
(Tr., p.10, Ls.17-25; cf Con£ Exh., p.15 (the PSI noting Mr. Cotterell reported a prior mental
health diagnosis, but that the PSE had not identified any such issues).)

Defense counsel

explained that one of the areas in which Mr. Cotterell had shown that improvement was his
recognition of the need for, and thus, amenability to, treatment.
1

(Tr., p.21, Ls.6-11.)

For

The determination of an average risk was based on Mr. Cotterell's scores on the STABLE 2007
and STATIC-99R tests. (Con£ Exh., p.39.) He scored 10 on the STABLE 2007, which placed
him in the moderate range. (Con£ Exh., p.39.) He scored only 1 on the STATIC-99R, but the
evaluator said that still put him in the average risk category on that test. (Con£ Exh., p.37.)
2

example, Mr. Cotterell recognized he needed treatment before he would be ready for release into
the community. (Tr., p.21, Ls.12-18.) Mr. Cotterell also expressed remorse for his conduct in
this case. (Tr., p.27, Ls.7-12.)
The district court acknowledged that Mr. Cotterell had shown some acceptance of
responsibly for his conduct, particularly by turning himself in. (Tr., p.28, Ls.10-13.) It also
considered the fact that his methamphetamine use had been a contributing factor. (Tr., p.30,
Ls.15-20.) However, because it felt long-term treatment was necessary, it imposed and executed
a unified sentence of twenty-seven years, with six years fixed. (Tr., p.32, Ls.3-7; R., pp.8-10.)
Mr. Cotterell filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgement of conviction. (R., pp. I 08, 119.)

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing and executing an excessive sentence
on Mr. Cotterell.

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing And Executing An Excessive Sentence
On Mr. Cotterell
Sentencing decisions are committed to the district court's discretion. State v. Reinke, 103
Idaho 771, 771 (Ct. App. 1982). Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed
an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the
record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See id. at 772. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of
discretion in the district court's sentencing decision, he must show that, in light of the governing
criteria, the sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts. State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho
293, 294 (1997); see Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863-64 (2018) (articulating the
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standard for reviewing whether the district court abused its discretion). The governing criteria,
or sentencing objectives, are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the
public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993).
The protection of society is the primary objective the court should consider. Id. The
Idaho Supreme Court has indicated that rehabilitation is usually the first means the district court
should consider to achieve that goal. See State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded
on other grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015); accord State v. Bickhart, 164

Idaho 204, 206 (Ct. App. 2018) (noting the preference identified in McCoy does not preclude a
sentence of incarceration, if that is ultimately the best method to achieve the goals of
sentencing). In other words, while the district court may place significant weight on one of the
goals of sentencing, that does not mean it can ignore mitigating factors speaking to one of the
other goals as being insignificant or unimportant. See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320
(2006) (noting that the failure to sufficiently consider various mitigating factors has resulted in
abuses of sentencing discretion in several cases).
In this case, the district court did not sufficiently consider the mitigating factors,
particularly as they relate to the decision of whether or not to retain jurisdiction. While it is true
that Mr. Cotterell needs long-term treatment to address his sexual and substance abuse issues, the
PSE specifically noted that, with proper structure and motivation of Mr. Cotterell, that treatment
could occur in the community. (Con£ Exh., pp.46-47.) Mr. Cotterell himselfrecognized that he
would need treatment in custody in order to get to that point. (Tr., p.21, Ls.12-18.) The rider
program would provide that initial, in-custody treatment, and would do so in a timelier manner
than the sentence imposed by the district court. It is this aspect of the relevant factors - the
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timeliness of the rehabilitative opportunity - that the district court failed to sufficiently consider.
See, e.g., State v. Dunnagan, 101 Idaho 125, 126 (1980) (reducing sentences from twenty-eight

to fourteen years because the defendants in that case "should be able to benefit, if at all, from
what rehabilitative programs are available" within the reduced period); Cook v. State, 145 Idaho
482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008) (reducing a sentence with a long fixed sentence because "such a
sentence essentially discounts any possibility of rehabilitation and successful reentry into
society'').
This conclusion is particularly true in light of the fact that this was Mr. Cotterell's first
felony conviction. See, e.g., State v. Shideler, l 03 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). It is also important
that Mr. Cotterell had not had significant treatment for his substance abuse issues (see Tr., p.21,
Ls.19-25), since drug use was a contributing factor in this case. See State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho
405, 414 n.5 (1981) (explaining that, while ingestion of drugs or alcohol is not a defense, it
should be considered as a mitigating factor).
As such, since Mr. Cotterell could have been safely supervised in the community with
proper structure and motivation, the district court abused its discretion by executing his sentence
when retaining jurisdiction would have better fostered the initial treatment necessary to set up the
proper structure and continuing treatment in the community. Compare State v. Eubank, 114
Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1988) (noting that sentences are to be crafted so that they do not force
the prison system to continue detaining a person once rehabilitation or age has decreased the risk
of recidivism). At least, it should have imposed a shorter fixed term to foster more timely get
access to the programs available while incarcerated. Compare Dunnagan, 101 Idaho at 126;
Cook, 145 Idaho at 489-90.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Cotterell respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 13th day of May, 2020.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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